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PROPOSAL FOR A WORKABLE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS
In United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the
United States Supreme Court adopted a modified good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. The adopted exception was lim-
ited to cases in which evidence was illegally seized as a result of
an improperly issued search warrant which was relied on by the
seizing officer in good faith. These decisions illustrate the Court's
willingness to reevaluate the objectives of the exclusionary rule
and portend the adoption of a good faith exception in which evi-
dence will be held admissible when an officer acts under the rea-
sonable, though mistaken, belief that his search or seizure was
legal. This Comment examines the workability of such a good
faith exception, and proposes a prospective judgment procedure
which preserves the deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule and
promotes development of fourth amendment principles.
INTRODUCTION
In October of 1982, the Supreme Court heard argument in Illi-
nois v. Gates,1 regarding whether probable cause for a search war-
rant could be based upon corroborated information provided by an
anonymous informant, who did not disclose how he acquired his in-
formation. Six weeks later, the Court restored the case to the calen-
dar for reargument and requested that both parties address an addi-
tional issue: "[w]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at criminal
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,2
...should to any extent be modified so as, for example, not to re-
quire the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that
the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
1. No. 81-430, slip op., (1983).
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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Amendment."3
The case was reargued before the Supreme Court in March of
1983; however, the Court's decision expressly declined to resolve the
issue upon which it had ordered the reargument.4 In justifying its
position, the Court noted the good faith issue was neither raised by
Illinois nor addressed in the lower courts. Thus, the Court concluded
that jurisprudential considerations dictated "that we reserve for an-
other day the question whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified." 5
Three weeks after Gates, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
United States v. Leon" and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, which
raised the issue of whether the Court should adopt a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. In July, 1984, the Court delivered
its opinion in these cases and held that the exclusionary rule should
be "modified so as not to bar the use of . . .evidence obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsup-
ported by probable cause."8
In addition to the Leon and Sheppard decisions, in the past two
decades the Supreme Court has fashioned several exceptions to the
exclusionary rule;9 four Justices have authored opinions which indi-
cate they firmly favor adopting a good faith exception. 10 Also note-
worthy is Justice O'Connor's statement at her confirmation hearing
that her experience as a trial judge "had led her to conclude that the
exclusionary rule sometimes interfered with the administration of
justice by requiring the exclusion of evidence.""" Although the Court
only adopted a modified good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, its holdings in Leon and Sheppard are indicative of the Court's
increasing willingness to create an exception to the exclusionary rule
for evidence obtained by an officer who acted under a mistaken, but
reasonable, good faith belief that his actions comported with the
fourth amendment. With five Justices favoring a good faith excep-
3. No. 81-430, slip op. at 1 (1983).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 9.
6. 679 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3919 (U.S. June 27,
1983) (No. 82-1771).
7. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3919 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 82-963).
8. United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5155 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (No. 82-
1771)(emphasis added).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 27-42.
10. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536(1976) (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J.,
and Rehnquist, J., concurring).
11. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1981, at 9, col. 3.
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tion and the adoption of a modified exception, the question presented
before the Supreme Court is not whether the Justices should adopt
such an exception, but rather how it may be administered.
This Comment addresses the workability of a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. First, the Comment reviews the develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception. Second,
it discusses the arguments against the exception. Finally, it proposes
a prospective judgment procedure which will resolve problems of ad-
ministration of the exception and establish a workable good faith
standard.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Part II of this Comment is an overview of the origins of the exclu-
sionary rule and the development of the good faith exception. This
examination will demonstrate that a good faith exception which pre-
serves the deterrent objectives of the exclusionary rule can be devel-
oped and practically implemented by the courts.
Origins of the Exclusionary Rule
The origins of the exclusionary rule may be traced to the Supreme
Court's 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States.1" In Boyd, the de-
fendant was charged with the illegal importation of goods. Relying
on a federal statute, the government obtained a court order compel-
ling the defendant to produce invoice papers which would show the
quantity and value of the goods imported. Drawing an analogy to
compelled self-incrimination,' 3 the Supreme Court concluded that
the fourth amendment prohibited compulsory production of the de-
fendant's private books and papers. 4
Several years after Boyd, the Court explicitly adopted an exclu-
sionary rule based on fourth amendment considerations in Weeks v.
United States.'5 In Weeks, the Court ordered evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment returned to a defendant charged
with transporting lottery tickets through the mails. The Court noted
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13. The Court noted that "[a] witness, as well as a party, is protected by the [fifth
amendment] law from being compelled to give evidence that tends to [incriminate] him."
Id. at 638. "[A] compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment.. ., because it is a material ingredient, and [affects] the sole object and purpose of
search and seizure." Id. at 622.
14. Id. at 638.
15. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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that if materials obtained in violation of the fourth amendment could
be used against the defendant, the guarantees of the fourth amend-
ment "might as well be stricken from the Constitution.""l Thus, the
Court concluded that the lower court's refusal to grant the defen-
dant's motion for return of the materials illegally seized was itself a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. The majority,
however, explicitly rejected application of the exclusionary rule to
violations by state or local police, limiting its holding to searches and
seizures by federal officers.
In 1949, the Supreme Court ruled in Wolf v. Colorado"' that the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police was
at the core of the fourth amendment and was enforceable against the
states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. However, the Court
ruled that the fourteenth amendment did not require a state to en-
force this right through the exclusionary rule. 9 Although the exclu-
sionary rule expanded the right of people to be secure from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by the states, there was no
concomitant means to enforce these rights at the state level save by
civil and equitable remedies.20
After more than a decade of controversy and confusion following
Wolf, the extension of the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions was
inevitable. In 1961, the Supreme Court made such an extension. The
majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio2" found the exclusionary rule an
essential part of the fourth amendment "as the right it embodies is
vouchsafed against the States by the Due Process Clause. ' 22 Thus,
the Court reasoned that the fourth amendment created the exclu-
sionary rule and the fourteenth amendment made it applicable to the
states.
16. Id. at 393.
17. Id. at 398.
18. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
19. Id. at 33. Justice Frankfurter noted in the majority opinion that the Court
would not "condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process
Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be
equally effective." Id. at 31.
20. Many categories of police abuses are actionable as common law torts in state
courts. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 498, 513 (1955). At the federal level, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp.
III 1979) provides a civil remedy for the deprivation of federally protected rights by a
person acting under the color of state law. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Nelson v. Steiner, 262
N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1978).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Id. at 651.
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Deterrence and the Balancing Test
Initially, the Supreme Court adopted three justifications for the
exclusionary rule: (1) protection of personal rights, (2) preservation
of judicial integrity,23 and (3) deterrence of unlawful police conduct.
Today, the Supreme Court has retained only the deterrence rationale
in its explanation of the underlying purpose of the exclusionary
rule. 4 The deterrence rationale has been the primary reason cited
for adopting a good faith exception. 25 An analysis of the deterrence
rationale is therefore essential to the development of a workable
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The deterrence rationale is based on the premise that the exclu-
sionary rule's "purpose is to deter - to compel respect for the con-
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way - by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it."'26 The rationale first began to
gain prominence in Linkletter v. Walker,27 where the Court refused
to apply Mapp retroactively. The Court reasoned that because the
23. Originally, the Court justified the exclusionary rule primarily on the judicial
integrity and deterrence rationales. The judicial integrity rationale was premised on the
belief that the courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Consti-
tution they are sworn to uphold." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). See
also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1975).
The personal rights rationale was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1973). The Court reasoned "[tihe purpose of
the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ....
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct and thereby effectu-
ate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures
... . In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 347-348.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 29-40; see also Coe, The ALI Substantial-
ity Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REV. 1, 17-24
(1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L.
REV. 665, 669-72 (1970); Comment, Impending "Frontal Assault" on the Citadel: The
Supreme Court's Readiness to Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth
Amendment to a Good Faith Standard, 12 TULSA L. J. 337, 350 (1976).
Justice Brennan has argued that the shift in emphasis on the deterrence rationale is
misplaced, that deterrence was not even considered to be a justification for the exclusion-
ary rule when it was first formulated. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 553
n.13 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5161-67
(U.S. July 5, 1984)(No. 82-1771)(Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 43-73. See generally Schroeder, Deterring
Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L. J.
1361, 1378-1417 (1981); Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasona-
ble" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. C iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 643-44,
651-55 (1978).
26. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
27. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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basis of the Mapp decision was that the exclusionary rule "was the
only effective deterrent to lawless police action," applying Mapp ret-
roactively would serve no purpose.28 In short, releasing previously
convicted prisoners would not correct the misconduct which occurred
before the Mapp decision.
In United States v. Calandra,29 the Supreme Court took the final
step in identifying deterrence as the sole justification for the exclu-
sionary rule. Calandra considered whether a grand jury witness
could refuse to answer questions based upon evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment. The Court's reasoning was based
solely upon the deterrence rationale.30 Adopting a balancing analy-
sis, the Court held that since the detriment to the grand jury's inves-
tigatory function far outweighed any potential deterrence to police
misconduct, the rule would not be applied in the grand jury setting.3 1
The Court employed this same balancing analysis in Stone v. Pow-
ell,3 2 where it refused to permit state prisoners to relitigate search
and seizure claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Similarly,
in United States v. Janis,33 the Court determined that "exclusion
from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a
state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a suffi-
cient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it
outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion."3" The balanc-
ing approach has also led the Court to conclude that unlawfully
seized evidence may be admitted to impeach a defendant's testimony
at his criminal trial;8 5 and may be admitted when law enforcement
agents act in good faith reliance upon a prior judicial decision, stat-
28. Id. at 636.
29. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
30. Id. at 347-52.
31. Id. at 349, 354. In reaching the conclusion that the use of illegally seized evi-
dence would not be prohibited in grand jury proceedings, the Court stated:
Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the
rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best .... We therefore decline to
embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal ad-
vance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of substantially im-
peding the role of the grand jury.
Id. at 351-52 (footnote omitted).
The Court went on to establish the supremacy of the deterrence rationale by dis-
missing the judicial integrity argument in a footnote. The majority did not even recog-
nize that judicial integrity is an independent rationale. The Court found that illegal con-
duct is not sanctioned by not extending the rule to a situation which does not further the
deterrence function. Id. at 355 n.l1. As the dissent pointed out, "the Court today dis-
counts to the point of extinction the vital function of [judicial integrity]." Id. at 360
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court held the substantial costs to society of sup-
pressing probative evidence would outweigh any marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 490-95.
33. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
34. Id. at 454.
35. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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ute, or ordinance that is subsequently held to be unconstitutional."
Finally, in United States v. Leon,37 the Court noted that the exclu-
sionary rule was designed to deter police transgressions rather than
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.3 8 Thus, where officers
objectively rely in good faith on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant, any evidence seized pursuant to that warrant may be ad-
mitted into evidence.89
These cases reflect the Court's gradual realization that "the exclu-
sion of evidence is not a personal constitutional right but a remedy,
which, like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of
its imposition." 40 These cases further reflect the Court's growing ten-
dency to adopt exceptions to the exclusionary rule which recognize
that the costs of the rule may outweigh its presumed deterrent bene-
fits. This may be particularly true when applied to reasonable, good
faith police actions.41 In short, the decision to exclude or not to ex-
clude depends on whether the rule will effectively deter illegal
searches at a reasonable cost to other values. 42
36. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan v. De Fillippo,
443 U.S. 31 (1979).
37. 52 U.S.L.W. 5155 (U.S. July 5, 1984)(No. 82-1771).
38. Id. at 5160.
39. Id. at 5162.
40. Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430, slip. op. at 11 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
41. See generally Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard
Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L.
REV. 51 (1980). Professor Bernardi stated: "The decisional history of the exclusionary
rule following Mapp must be seen as a gradual, yet inexorable movemint towards adop-
tion of a good faith standard to govern application of the rule." Id. at 58.
42. A necessary corollary of this decision is an evaluation of the substantiality of
the anticipated deterrence. As the Court noted in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447
(1974):
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a
result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating
officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the
rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good
faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
In a similar vein, in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975), the Court
stated:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 & n.35 (1976).
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The Good Faith Exception
An increasing number of legal commentators,43 courts,44 and legis-
lative leaders, 45 have begun advocating an exception to the exclusion-
ary rule for evidence obtained by a well-trained police officer who
acted under a mistaken, but reasonable, good faith belief that his
conduct comported with fourth amendment requirements. They rea-
son that suppression in such cases accomplishes nothing beyond
causing reliable evidence to be kept from the trier of fact.46 This
substantially impairs the truthfinding process,47 sometimes permits
dangerous criminals to be released, 48 and causes the public to lose
faith in the criminal justice system.49 Because the exclusionary rule
is not constitutionally mandated, but is a judicially created remedy50
designed solely to deter unconstitutional police conduct, it should be
modified where suppression of probative evidence will have no deter-
43. See, e.g., supra note 24.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1980) (war-
rantless security wiretap although unlawful was not suppressed where agents acted in
good faith and could not be charged with knowledge that their conduct was improper),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1503
(11 th Cir. 1983) (where entry into cabin of boat violated defendant's fourth amendment
rights, evidence seized in inventory search incident to arrest did not require suppression
under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Nolan, 530 F.
Supp. 386, 396-99 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (suppression not required for technical, good faith
violation of knock-and-announce rule), revd, 718 F.2d 589, 598 n.14 (3d Cir. 1983)(declined to adopt good faith exception because it had not as yet been adopted by the
Supreme Court); United States v. Wilson, 528 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(even though arrest which took place outside of officer's territorial jurisdiction was not a
lawful citizen's arrest, good faith exception bars suppression of marijuana seized incident
to the arrest); Gifford v. State, 630 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (suppression
not required where officers relied in good faith on a search warrant later found to be
technically defective); Richmond v. Commonwealth, 50 U.S.L.W. 2162 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981) (same); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y.
1981).
45. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Just., Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime: Final Report 55 (1981). Recommendation 40 of the Report states that "evidence
should not be excluded from a criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer
acting in the reasonable, good faith belief that it was in conformity to the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution." For congressional action, see, e.g., S. 2231, 97th
Cong., 2d Sss. (1982), amending the federal criminal code to provide that evidence
obtained by a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a federal proceeding if the seiz-
ing officer had a reasonable, good faith belief that the search or seizure was conducted in
conformity with the fourth amendment to the Constitution. See also The Exclusionary
Rule Bills: Hearings on S. 101, S. 751, and S. 1995. Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sss. 3 (1982). Legis-
lation enacting a good faith exception has been adopted in Arizona and Colorado. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3925 (1982) (Court not to suppress evidence if it "was seized by
a peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation"); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-3-308 (1982) (similar).
46. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 & n.29 (1976).
47. See Id. See also Schroeder, supra note 24.
48. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490.
49. See id. at 491.
50. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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rent effect,51 i.e., where an officer acted under a reasonable, good
faith belief that his actions were lawful.
As noted in the preceding section, the primary justification for the
exclusionary rule is deterrence. A workable good faith exception
should therefore preserve the deterrent efficacy of the rule. When an
officer operates under a reasonable, though mistaken, belief about
the law or certain facts, then the deterrent effect of the rule is obvi-
ated. A police officer will not be deterred from conducting an uncon-
stitutional search or seizure if he does not know it is uncon-
stitutional.
Police officers are not trained legal technicians. Deterrence does
not occur so much because police officers read suppression decisions
as it does because policy makers develop departmental policies in
accordance with these decisions.5 2- Through police training programs
and internal guidelines, police officers are apprised of recent develop-
ments in fourth amendment law and are expected to alter their con-
duct accordingly. Unfortunately, however, the courts are often re-
miss in articulating coherent, readily recognizable fourth amendment
standards. In turn, the law enforcement agencies have often left indi-
vidual police officers to resolve these difficult questions while in the
field.53
With so little judicial guidance, it is not surprising that inadver-
tent errors of judgment and honest mistakes occur when officers in
51. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 219-20 (2d Ed. 1975); Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 430-32 (1974).
53. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 470 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A review of the Court's decisions in Belton and Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981), illustrates the problems that an officer in the field must face when conducting
what he considers to be a reasonable search and seizure. The facts of these cases are
remarkably similar. In both cases, police officers lawfully stopped a car, smelled mari-
juana, found marijuana in the passenger compartment, and lawfully arrested the occu-
pants. Thereafter, in Robbins, the officers searched the car, found two packages wrapped
in green opaque paper in the rear compartment of the car, opened the packages without
a warrant, and discovered thirty pounds of marijuana. In Belton, the officer found a
jacket in the passenger compartment, unzipped the jacket without a warrant, and found
a quantity of cocaine.
In both Robbins and Belton, five opinions were delivered by the Court, none of which
carried a majority. Ultimately, what emanated from the Court was a sharp division
among the Justices as to whether the searches were legal. Thus, three Justices believed
that both searches were legal, three Justices argued that both searches were illegal; and
three Justices controlled the final decision. The officer who made the search in Robbins
may derive some consolation from the fact that a year later the decision was overruled in
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). For a thoughtful analysis of these three
cases, see Comment, The Expanding Scope of Warrantless Automobile Searches:
United States v. Ross, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 457 (1983).
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the field are required to make quick decisions on whether the requi-
site probable cause exists to support an arrest or a search. Arguably,
it is wrong to penalize, through the suppression of probative evi-
dence, the officer's reasonable mistakes which a judge in hindsight
deems to be unconstitutional.
The courts have engendered a state of uncertainty with regard to
fourth amendment standards. Fourth amendment adjudications inev-
itably leave "much room for disagreement among judges, each of
whom is convinced that both he and his colleagues are reasonable
men. Surely when [the Supreme Court] divides five to four on issues
of probable cause, it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was at
fault or acted unreasonably in making the arrest."" The exclusion-
ary rule is least efficacious in deterring police misconduct in these
"grey, twilight area[s], where the law is difficult for courts to apply,
let alone for the policeman on the beat to understand." 5 A good
faith exception recognizes these difficulties and attempts to resolve
them through an objective and subjective analysis of the police of-
ficer's actions.
Such a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was first ar-
ticulated and rationalized by Justice White in his dissenting opinion
in Stone v. Powell.56 According to Justice White, when an officer
conducts an unreasonable search or seizure under the mistaken,
though good faith, belief that it was constitutional, the evidence
should be admitted. He noted, however, that under the current ex-
clusionary rule, evidence recurringly "is excluded without any realis-
tic expectation that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to
the purposes of the rule."'57
Justice White proposed that the Court adopt a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule which would take these factors into con-
sideration. According to his proposal, a prosecutor must satisfy a
two-prong test to avoid exclusion of evidence seized by an unreasona-
ble search or seizure. First, the prosecuting attorney must show that
the seizing officer had a good faith belief that his conduct comported
with existing law.58 Second, he must demonstrate that the officer had
reasonable grounds for his belief.09
The first appellate decision to adopt a good faith exception was
United States v. Williams,60 an en banc decision by the Fifth Cir-
54. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting).
55. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 269 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
56. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
57. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. His actions should be determined on the basis of how an officer of reasona-
ble prudence would have acted under the circumstances, and whether he had reasonable
grounds for acting as he did.
60. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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cuit. In Williams, the defendant had been convicted of possession of
heroin and released on bail"' on the condition that she remain in
Ohio. She was arrested in Atlanta by a federal agent who knew of
the travel restriction. During her arrest, the agent discovered that
she was carrying heroin.62 At trial, the district court granted her mo-
tion to suppress the seized heroin on the ground that she had been
illegally arrested.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and unanimously held
the heroin should have been admitted. In one majority opinion, six-
teen judges held that Williams had been lawfully arrested for violat-
ing a condition of her bail release. 63 More significantly, the second
majority.opinion by thirteen judges held that "evidence is not to be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by of-
ficers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the
reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.""
The Williams court recognized two situations in which the good
faith exception would be applicable: "technical violations" and "fac-
tual mistakes. '6 5 These two situations correspond to what are known
in criminal law as "mistakes of law" and "mistakes of fact." The
court reasoned:
First, an officer may make a judgmental error concerning the existence of
facts sufficient to constitute probable cause. Such cases may be character-
ized as examples of "good faith mistake." Second, an officer may rely upon
a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later in-
validated, or a court precedent which is later overruled. In each of these
cases, the officer may be deemed to have committed a. "technical
violation." 66
The court concluded that whenever either of these two situations
arises, "[a]ny slight deterrent effect of excluding fruits of good-faith
arrests is even less than the small deterrence" 67 which the Supreme
Court had, in previous cases, concluded "does not justify the societal
harm incurred by suppressing relevant and incriminating evi-
dence."68 Thus, the court concluded, if no deterrent purpose is to be
achieved by excluding good faith evidence, then the exclusionary
61. Id. at 833.
62. Id. at 834.
63. Id. at 836-39.
64. Id. at 840.
65. Id. at 841; such a definition was first proposed by Edna F. Ball, and was relied
on by the court and incorporated into its opinion. See Ball, supra note 25.
66. Id. at 841 (quoting Ball, supra note 25, at 638-39).
67. Id. at 842.
68. Id. at 843.
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rule should not be applied.
Although the concept of a good faith exception is alluring, it is not
a panacea for all of the ills which plague the exclusionary rule; nor is
it without its own detractors."
The primary arguments against a good faith exception are three-
fold. First, opponents claim it would "put a premium on the igno-
rance of the police officer and, more significantly, on the department
which trains him."7 0 Second, it would halt judicial development of
fourth amendment rights.71 And finally, it would "insulate important
areas of police misconduct from judicial oversight and control."7 2
These criticisms must be answered if a workable good faith doctrine
is to be adopted. The final section of the Comment will address these
criticisms and propose a workable good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.
PROPOSAL FOR A WORKABLE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION:
PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS
As discussed in the preceding section, the good faith exception
recognizes that it is wrong to penalize officers for actions taken in
good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they
are constitutional. 3 It further recognizes that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied when the deterrent effect of exclusion does not
outweigh the societal costs, 74 or no deterrent effect exists.75
The current good faith exception, as adopted in Williams, how-
ever, has a serious procedural omission which must be addressed by
the courts. Although the procedure requires courts to undertake a
two-prong subjective and objective analysis of a police officer's be-
havior, it fails to provide the officer with clearly articulated fourth
amendment standards for future police conduct. In order for the
courts to answer the criticisms against the good faith exception and
implement a workable doctrine, the judiciary must develop proce-
69. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L. J. 365 (1981); 1 W.
LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 1.1-.2
(1978 and 1983 Supp.); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limita-
tions and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (1982).
70. Kaplan, Limits on the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1044
(1974).
71. See generally Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 70; Oaks, supra note 24, at
678; see also Justice Brennan's dissent in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 &
n.14 (1974).
72. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 70, at 425.
73. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
74. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 & n.29 (1975).
75. See id. at 540 (White, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Williams, 622
F.2d at 847.
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dures to review and adjudge police actions which promote evolution
of fourth amendment law and deter police misconduct. This may be
accomplished by instituting prospective judgments in suppression
hearings at the trial court level.
Problems with the Current Good Faith Exception
As noted earlier, under the Williams good faith exception, a police
officer must satisfy a two-prong test - i.e., he must demonstrate
that his actions were taken in both subjective and objective good
faith - if his unconstitutionally seized evidence is to be admitted.76
The subjective element ensures that police officers do not willfully
abuse an individual's rights;77 the objective element requires that po-
lice conduct comply with established fourth amendment standards.78
Under the Williams analysis, however, an officer's reasonableness
is not translated into articulable standards for future police conduct.
In order to deter police officers from performing unreasonable
searches and seizures, they must be told what actions will be deemed
to be unreasonable in the future. The Williams analysis fails to
bridge this procedural gap between constitutional theory and practi-
cal application.
The issue before the Williams court was whether the Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA) agent who arrested Williams had statu-
tory authority to make a warrantless arrest for a violation of a bond
condition committed in his presence.79 The first majority decision of
the court concluded that the DEA agent had conducted a legal
search and seizure and that the drugs should be admitted.80
The second majority opinion agreed that the seized drugs should
have been admitted, but on different grounds. According to this deci-
sion, suppression of the drugs "was wrong whether or not Williams'
76. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 841 nn.4-4a.
77. Generally, the only evidence offered on the subjective good faith question is the
officer's own testimony; and "[s]uch testimony, whether truthful or perjured, is almost
impossible to refute." See Ball, supra note 25, at 655. However, this is not to say that the
courts should simply make a cursory examination of the subjective good faith of the
officer's actions. A court could, for example, examine the officer's records to see if they
demonstrate a consistent pattern of behavior which often resulted in suppression of his
evidence. Under such circumstances, the court would be justified in finding that the of-
ficer acted in bad faith and that the evidence should be suppressed. In fact, two commen-
tators have argued that a close look at the record of the agent whose conduct was re-
viewed in Williams reveals that he may not have acted in good faith. See Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 70, at 417-23.
78. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a.
79. Id. at 836.
80. Id. at 839.
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violation of a bond condition was such a crime as warranted her ar-
rest and the consequent search of her person that revealed their pres-
ence."'81 The court held that evidence is not to be suppressed when it
is seized in good faith by an officer under the mistaken, though rea-
sonable, belief that his actions were constitutional. 2
Three flaws exist in the analysis expressed in the second majority
opinion. First, the court does not adequately determine whether the
officer's actions were constitutionally mandated, or as in this case,
legally authorized. Second, the court does not sufficiently explain
why the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances.8 3
And finally, the court does not effectively articulate fourth amend-
ment standards for future police conduct.
Without clearly articulated standards to govern their conduct, of-
ficers will not be deterred from taking similar actions in the future.
Thus, by failing to articulate fourth amendment standards which
would deter future police misconduct, the court has halted the devel-
opment of fourth amendment law in this area and encouraged igno-
rance by other law enforcement officers.
Prospective Judgment Procedure
The above analysis of Williams demonstrates the need for a proce-
dure by which the courts can institute a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule while simultaneously preserving the rule's deterrent
effect and promoting development of fourth amendment principles.
A prospective judgment procedure would effectively achieve these
dual goals.
Under the prospective judgment procedure, trial courts would ad-
judicate fourth amendment issues before evaluating a possible good
faith exemption argument.84 After deciding the constitutionality of
81. Id. at 840.
82. Id.
83. The court did not explain what it considered to be unreasonable conduct under
the circumstances. Instead, it confined its definition of "reasonableness" to a footnote,
merely stating the conclusion that the officer's actions were reasonable under the circum-
stances. Id. at 841 n.4a. Such a conclusion provides little guidance to law enforcement
administrative agencies responsible for formulating police procedures in accordance with
the decision, or to police officers who must comply with these procedures.
84. In United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5162 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (No.
82-1771), the Court suggests that application of a good faith exception to searches con-
ducted pursuant to an invalid warrant does not preclude the lower court from reviewing
the constitutionality of the search or seizure. The Court noted that "[i]f the resolution of
a particular fourth amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law en-
forcement officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing courts from deciding
that question before turning to the good-faith issue. Id. (footnote omitted). But see id. at
5176 n. 35 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting)(argued that a proceeding in which
"a court would declare that the Constitution had been violated but that it was unwilling
to do anything about it, seems a mockery").
The proposed prospective judgment procedure would institute a constitutional review
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the officer's conduct, the trial judge would then determine whether
the police officer's actions were in good faith and comported with
what should be expected of a reasonable, well-trained law enforce-
ment officer.85 The evidence would not be suppressed if the court
finds that although a fourth amendment right has been violated, the
officer acted under a reasonable, though mistaken, legal or factual
belief that his conduct was constitutional. After ruling on the sup-
pression motion, the court would issue a prospective judgment, based
on its initial analysis of the fourth amendment violation. This judg-
ment would delimit future permissible 'police conduct within the
court's jurisdiction and be directed not only toward counsel, but the
police officer and the agency that trains him as well.
Prospective judgments would be informally directed toward future
police conduct and would put police officers on notice that hence-
forth such conduct would be prohibited by the courts in that jurisdic-
tion. Any subsequent arrest or search that violated a prior prospec-
tive judgment would not be exempted from the exclusionary rule
simply because a police officer was unaware of or misinterpreted the
pertinent case law.
Enforcement agencies would inform their personnel of the relevant
fourth amendment law and the prospective judgments. Thus, copies
of prospective judgments should be forwarded to the law enforce-
ment officer's employing agency, the United States Attorney, the
District Attorney, the City Attorney or County Counsel responsible
for defending the employing agency in civil suits, the Public De-
fender's office and judges and magistrates within the reviewing
court's jurisdiction. These decisions will assist the agencies in train-
ing their officers, and provide consistency in the interpretation of the
law.
Thus, the police officer would remain responsible for knowing the
clearly defined law, and the officer would be well advised to keep
abreast of the latest developments in the law. Furthermore, the ob-
jective standard would preserve every incentive for law enforcement
process, similar to that suggested by the Court in Leon, as a regular practice at suppres-
sion hearings. Adjudication of fourth amendment claims under this procedure, therefore,
ultimately will provide consistency in the law and guidance to police and magistrates.
85. In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court adopted an objective standard for
determining the reasonableness of an officer's actions in executing a search or seizure.
The Court emphasized that it did not include a subjective determination of the officer's
good faith as part of its analysis. Id. at 5161 & n.20. This Comment, however, proposes
that the reviewing court should conduct both an objective and subjective analysis of the
officer's conduct in determining whether he acted under a reasonable, though good faith
belief that his actions were lawful. See infra text accompany notes 97-99.
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agencies to ensure that their officers remain aware of the develop-
ment of fourth amendment law.
Law enforcement agencies are generally in a better position than
the courts to translate the prospective judgments into meaningful
and applicable standards which will govern future police behavior.86
Through the implementation of institutional policies and officer
training programs, the agencies are in the unique position to dictate
and ensure further development of fourth amendment law. Their ac-
tions are checked because successful prosecutions will depend upon
implementing policies which guarantee that their officers comply
with the letter of the law as proposed by the prospective judgments.87
The success of such institutional notification procedures and training
programs for changes in search and seizure law have been well docu-
mented in certain limited contexts.88
86. Police officers are more likely to respond to administrative policies developed
by fellow law enforcement officials than they are to the courts. See J. SKOLNICK, supra
note 53, at 225-29.
87. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their dissent in United States v. Leon, noted
that "the chief deterrent function of the [exclusionary] rule is its tendency to promote
institutional compliance with fourth amendment requirements on the part of law enforce-
ment agencies generally." 52 U.S.L.W. at 5170 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). (footnote omitted). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (Stevens,
J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 70, at 399-401. The proposed pro-
spective judgment procedure maintains the rule's effectiveness as a "systemic" deterrent;
it provides an impetus to police training programs to ensure that officers are aware of
limits imposed by the fourth amendment and the need to operate within those limits.
88. Professors Mertens & Wasserstrom have noted the important deterrent effect
that such departmental policies can have on officers.
[E]ven if a particular constable is indifferent to whether his arrests and seizures
result in convictions, those who run the police department are concerned with
successful prosecutions. Further, although individual officers might entertain
hostility toward fourth amendment rights, police departments are not likely to
share such a view, at least officially. Thus, at least the more professional police
forces can be expected to encourage fourth amendment compliance through
training and such guidelines as the department provides for conducting searches,
seizures, and arrests . . .. Even if prosecutors cannot always find the time to
explain the fourth amendment to the police, many of the larger police depart-
ments hire legal counsel to make legal standards intelligible to the policeman on
patrol.
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 70, at 399.
An excellent example of the effectiveness of procedural deterrence is the reaction of
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police to the Supreme Court's decision in Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse, the Court struck down "random stops"
of cars for license or registration checks in the absence of articulable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police had been conducting such
stops, but after the Supreme Court delivered its decision, "[t]he Chief of Police issued an
immediate telex message to his officers, advising them to desist from the practice" and
then "incorporat[ed] the change in procedures in the Department's General Orders, a set
of regulations issued to each officer and with which each officer must be familiar." Mer-
tens & Wasserstrom, supra note 70 at 400. Additionally, even before the Court ruled in
Prouse, the Delaware State Police Legal Officer, in response to the trial court's ruling
invalidating such stops, "had disseminated a memorandum to all troops and units within
the State Police describing the decision, explaining the conduct prohibited, and advising
that it did not affect stops based on articulable suspicion," and "provid[ing] several ex-
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Opponents of the good faith exception claim it would halt the de-
velopment of substantive fourth amendment law by removing the ac-
cused's incentive to appeal a trial court decision, absent factually
identical precedent invalidating the search or seizure. 9 Arguably,
this would deprive appellate courts of their only opportunity to ana-
lyze constitutional rights and guide both lower courts and law en-
forcement officials.90 These opponents claim that this deprivation will
effectively halt evolution of fourth amendment rights.
The prospective judgment procedure, however, would not curtail
judicial development of fourth amendment law.9 1 On the contrary, it
would facilitate the articulation of fourth amendment standards.
Under the proposed good faith rule, every challenge to a search or
seizure would first require the trial courts to enunciate relevant con-
stitutional standards.
Furthermore, the requirement of an initial constitutional determi-
nation may have a salutary effect in the courts.92 Courts may feel
freer to interpret the fourth amendment honestly and more liberally
because the good faith exception will allow admission of probative
evidence despite a finding of unconstitutionality; the exclusionary
rule in the past may have caused courts to restrict their interpreta-
tion because of the realization that a broad and protective interpre-
tation of the fourth amendment might cause dangerous criminals to
be released. 93 Thus, a good faith exception gives the courts the op-
portunity to fully articulate and interpret the fourth amendment.
Finally, because the substantial windfall of exclusion would re-
main available to those defendants who could show unreasonable po-
lice conduct, it is unrealistic to assume that defendants with colora-
amples of facts that could provide sufficient articulable suspicion for a stop." Id.
A number of other commentators have underlined the importance of written police
rules in the governance of police conduct. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
- A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 659 (1972); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81 YALE L.
J. 575 (1972).
89. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
but see Ball, supra note 25, at 655 (under good faith doctrine mere lack of clear prece-
dent on identical facts would not automatically require denial of motion to suppress).
90. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 555 (quoting Oaks, supra note 24, at
756).
91. See United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, 5162 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (No.
82-1771).
92. See Bernardi, supra note 41; SKOLNICK, supra note 53. See also United States
v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 5160 n.18.
93. See Bernardi, supra note 41, at 51. See also United States v. Leon, 52
U.S.L.W. at 5162 n. 26 (quoting Schroeder, supra note 25 at 1420-21).
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bly meritorious claims of fourth amendment violations will lose their
incentive to appeal.94 Defendants will continue to have the opportu-
nity to appeal the trial court's determination of the seizing officer's
good faith. And in some jurisdictions, the defendant may file an in-
terlocutory appeal and have the matter reviewed immediately. In ei-
ther case, the appellate court will have the opportunity to review
fourth amendment law and articulate constitutional standards for fu-
ture search and seizure conduct.
Public defender's offices, and other organizations which regularly
represent criminal defendants, would have considerable incentive to
appeal a trial court's decision in such circumstances, not only for the
sake of their present client but for those who they may represent in
the future. Thus, "the chances seem slim indeed that a constitutional
issue of some importance, as to which a judge-made change in law is
a reasonable possibility, will not be raised and presented
effectively." 95
Practical Application of the Proposed Good Faith Exception
This subsection presents a hypothetical situation to analyze how a
court would administer the exception, to show how a law enforce-
ment agency would translate the court's judgment into a meaningful
policy for the officer in the field, and to demonstrate that no matter
how the trial court rules on a suppression motion, the defendant will
still have the incentive to appeal fourth amendment issues.
Suppose an officer demonstrated sufficient probable cause and ob-
tained a valid search warrant to search the defendant's home for
narcotics. When the officer arrived at the defendant's home, he
knocked at the front door and announced to persons inside that he
sought to be admitted to discharge his duties. The defendant was
located on the third floor of the three-story structure in a back bed-
room and was unaware of the officer's presence. After a sufficient
time elapsed, the officer broke in the front door of the premises and
proceeded to the room where the defendant was located. Without
again announcing his presence, the officer broke into the defendant's
bedroom, executed the warrant, and during the course of his search
discovered five ounces of cocaine.
Appearing before a federal district court, the defendant filed a
motion to suppress the seized cocaine, claiming the officer conducted
an unreasonable search and seizure because he failed to knock and
announce his presence before entering the bedroom. In response to
the motion, the prosecutor makes two claims. First, he claims that
94. United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 5162 n.25.
95. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA.
L. REv. 1557, 1614 (1975).
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the search and seizure were not unreasonable. Alternatively, he con-
tends the evidence should be admitted on the basis of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.
The court will engage in a two-step analysis in determining
whether to suppress the evidence. First, the court must determine
whether the officer's actions were unconstitutional. If the court de-
termines that the officer fully complied with fourth amendment prin-
ciples, the motion would be denied. Depending on the local rules in
the jurisdiction, however, the defendant could file an interlocutory
appeal and immediately have the constitutional question reviewed by
the federal circuit court of appeals. This ensures that the appellate
courts have the opportunity to develop fourth amendment law.
If the court determined that the officer's actions were unconstitu-
tional - that the officer was required to knock and announce his
presence at the second door - the court would consider the prosecu-
tion's good faith exception claim and begin the second step of its
analysis. Within this second step are two related questions: first,
whether the officer had a good faith belief that his conduct was law-
ful; and second, whether he had reasonable grounds to believe his
conduct comported with existing law.96
In order to determine the officer's subjective good faith belief that
his conduct was constitutional the court must look at the totality of
the circumstances. Here the officer had probable cause, obtained a
valid search warrant,97 and knocked on the defendant's door and an-
nounced his presence. Additionally, he was operating under a reason-
able, though mistaken, legal belief that his conduct was constitu-
tional. Without any clearly defined search and seizure procedures to
guide him, he acted as any reasonable officer would have acted under
the circumstances.
Had the officer been relying on an administrative policy or a prior
judicial decision which announced that an officer need only knock
and announce his presence once when executing his duties, then the
court would find his actions were reasonable.9 8
96. See supra notes 85-86.
97. Arguably, application for a warrant would be prima facie evidence of the of-
ficer's subjective good faith. See Fitzhugh, The New Exclusionary Rule Cases, 70
A.B.A. J. 58, 60 (1984).
98. The proposed prospective judgment procedure is consistent with the Supreme
Court's current analysis of retroactivity cases in which a police officer relied upon a prior
judicial decision at law later found to be unconstitutional. Although the Court has been
willing to conclude that new fourth amendment principles are always to have prospective
effect, United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982), when confronted with a
retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule, it has consistantly accorded
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After examining the record, the court will determine whether to
grant the prosecution the good faith exception and allow the evi-
dence to be introduced. Coupled with this determination will be a
prospective judgment delimiting the future conduct of police officers
in like circumstances. 99
If the court determines the officer's actions were unconstitutional
but done in good faith, the motion to suppress would be denied. The
court, however, would also issue a prospective judgment requiring all
officers within the court's jurisdiction to thereafter knock and an-
nounce their presence a second time when confronted with a situa-
tion similar to the officer in the present case.
The prospective judgment would be forwarded to the officer's em-
ploying agency, the United States Attorney, the District Attorney,
the City Attorney or County Counsel, and judges and magistrates,
within the court's jurisdiction, all of whom would be charged with
constructive knowledge of the court's decision. It therefore would be
in their best interest to ensure that police officers and other law en-
forcement agents who must comply with the court's decision are in-
formed immediately of the change in the law. 100
The prospective judgment would reach only law enforcement
agents within the court's jurisdiction. Thus, if a court in another ju-
risdiction were to determine a week later that a police officer is not
required to knock and announce his presence a second time, the rul-
ing would not affect officers within the first jurisdiction.
Because knowledge of the prospective judgment is imputed to of-
ficers within the court's jurisdiction, officers are required to alter
their actions immediately. Thus, if an officer, one week after issu-
ance of the prospective judgment, failed to announce his presence a
second time under like circumstances, the prosecution could not
make a good faith exception claim when a motion to suppress is
made.
any newly articulated principle which "marks a clear break with the past" prospective
application only. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 244 (1979); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
In determining whether a new principle of law should be given retroactive effect, the
Court has relied primarily upon three considerations: "(a) the purpose to be served by
the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards." Stovell v. Denno, 338 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). In assessing
these three considerations, the Court has recognized that the policies underlying the ex-
clusionary rule do not require retroactive application in cases where officers acted in good
faith reliance upon administrative regulations. See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 536-38. Suppres-
sion of the evidence in such a situation would have no deterrent effect. Id. at 542.
99. See supra notes 86-9 and accompanying text.
100. For examples of hypothetical police-made rules, see Hyman, In Pursuit of a
More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAc. L. J. 33, 58-
61 (1978); Quinn, The Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment
Rights, 52 U. DaT. J. URB. L. 25, 44-54 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing hypothetical, and its accompanying analysis, illus-
trates that the courts can adopt a workable good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. This Comment concludes that a prospective
judgment procedure would allow courts to remain free to decide sig-
nificant unsettled questions of law or to adjudicate particularly prob-
lematic or recurring factual situations that give cause for concern.
The accused, on the other hand, would still have the incentive to
litigate a possible fourth amendment challenge. The police officer
and enforcement agencies would be put on notice of substantive
fourth amendment law, and would be encouraged to upgrade their
continuing legal education programs. The adoption of a good faith
exception coupled with a prospective judgment procedure would pre-
serve the deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule while simultane-
ously recognizing that exclusion will not deter when a police officer
acts under the reasonable though mistaken belief that his actions
comported with the Constitution.
KELLY J. SALT
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